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Defining One’s Own Concept of  
Existence and the Meaning of the Universe:  
The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas 
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own 
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of 
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian 
of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are 
greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to 
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the  
rest. . . .
1
 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.
2
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
3
 the 
landmark 2003 ruling overturning a Texas statute criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy, strikes at the very heart of a debate that has 
been raging in academic and political circles ever since the Court’s 
revival of substantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut.
4
 The 
crux of the debate focuses on a question primal to political theory: if 
an expansive understanding is to be given to the right of the 
individual “to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life,”
5
 what legitimate role 
is left for the state to declare moral limitations upon the definitions 
individuals choose? 
                                                
 1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 267, 268 (Joel Feinberg & 
Jules Coleman eds., 7th ed. 2004). 
 2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 5. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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This note argues that Lawrence stands for a presumption of 
liberty protecting the private acts of individuals under the Due 
Process Clause. Simply put, this means that if the government fails to 
show that its restrictions on individual exercises of liberty are not 
necessary and proper regulations of behavior harmful to others, the 
mere claim that the government is upholding morality grounded in 
“history” or “traditions” should not justify such restrictions on 
liberty. This reading of Lawrence recognizes the Court’s decision 
both as a victory for a more sound adjudication of substantive due 
process claims and as an accurate understanding of the libertarian 
underpinnings of American constitutionalism. Far from the fears of 
the dissent, Lawrence does not signal the end of morality in the law, 
but rather it recasts morality in terms that are palatable both to 
contemporary intuitions of what liberty means and to a classical 
understanding of the role of the individual in liberal democracy. In 
the final analysis, Lawrence is best seen as a substantial victory for the 
right of all Americans to define their own concepts of meaning and 
value in matters fundamental to how individuals constitute their very 
existence. 
Part II of this note gives an overview of the Court’s substantive 
due process jurisprudence in order to give context to Lawrence’s 
potential reach beyond sexual autonomy cases. Part III analyzes the 
Court’s opinion in Lawrence, focusing on Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion. Part IV offers a particular interpretation of the majority 
opinion, arguing that Lawrence is nothing less than a watershed 
moment both for a renewed soundness in constitutional 
jurisprudence, and for the revival of libertarian values that have far 
too long been ignored by the Court. This part argues that Lawrence 
can and should be read as ushering in a presumption of liberty in 
subsequent cases brought before the Court. This part also offers a 
rejoinder to the principal arguments of Justice Scalia’s dissent, 
relying on the writings of Joel Feinberg to argue that Scalia’s most 
sweeping claims are misplaced or incorrect because they fail to grasp 
the proper limits of legal moralism. Part V offers a short conclusion. 
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II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY:  
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM SLAUGHTER- 
HOUSE TO “FOOTNOTE FOUR PLUS” 
As an overview of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence, this section analyzes the Court’s watershed moments 
in substantive rights analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
set the context for the Court’s decision in Lawrence, and to show 
why Lawrence has the potential to correct some of the Court’s more 
egregious errors in this field. The robust conception of liberty 
advanced by Lawrence embraces a view of autonomy that is central 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of substantive liberty as 
well as to broader conceptions of human autonomy central to the 
purposes of liberal society. As the following analysis will show, a 
crucial error in much of the Court’s earlier substantive rights 
jurisprudence was its failure to grasp the primacy of a presumption in 
favor of such conceptions of liberty and autonomy over the 
competing presumption in favor of the government’s regulatory 
authority. 
As has been noted by numerous commentators, Lawrence, even 
apart from its socially significant holding, is a potential watershed 
because of the way in which the Court reviewed the statute before it. 
“Lawrence is one of several recent cases indicating that the certainty 
of the dichotomy between strict scrutiny and low-level scrutiny is 
breaking down.”
6
 Justice Kennedy’s opinion striking down the Texas 
statute specifically did not declare a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy. For Supreme Court scholars, this point is 
significant because, “[u]ntil recently, careful review, indeed any 
meaningful review, of the substantive legitimacy of criminal statutes 
                                                
 6. Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality 
Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 233 (2005). 
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action 
program at the University of Michigan Law School under a balancing test while applying strict 
scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding state law disadvantaging 
homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis test); Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 869 (upholding a woman’s constitutional liberty to terminate her pregnancy, but holding 
that such a liberty is not absolute and should be balanced against the competing interests of 
the state); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990) (recognizing a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in individual refusal of medical treatment, but 
holding that states may require such a refusal to be established by clear and convincing 
evidence); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985) (using 
rational basis to strike down a zoning ordinance disadvantaging the mentally disabled under 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
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was essentially nonexistent unless a narrow category of ‘fundamental 
rights’ were implicated.”
7
 Lawrence, in the clearest of terms, 
indicates that this may no longer be the case; in other words, “[t]he 
mere enactment of a criminal statute will be insufficient to establish 
that it is not an arbitrary act, and is therefore a violation of 
[substantive] due process.”
8
 In coming years, the Court may well see 
Lawrence as ushering in the expanded use of “rational basis with a 
bite” review that places the burden on the government to establish 
the necessity of its regulation, rather than on the individual to 
establish the fundamentality of her liberty interest. Seen in this way, 
Lawrence has the potential to reorient the Court’s jurisprudence in a 
number of areas related to substantive due process claims beyond the 
limited area of human sexual autonomy. 
A. The Original Meaning (and Early “Slaughter”)  
of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution “to ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill 
of 1866 and to prevent future Congresses from reneging on its 
guarantees.”
9
 One of the most significant functions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was its protection of certain fundamental 
rights stemming from federal citizenship against encroachment by all 
branches of state governments.
10
 The Amendment provides, in part, 
that  
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
                                                
 7. Beschle, supra note 6, at 233. 
 8. Id. 
 9. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 60 (2003). 
 10. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What’s so Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J. LAW 
& LIBERTY 7 (forthcoming). 
At the risk of oversimplification, another way to characterize the distinct functions of 
each of the three clauses is this: The Privileges or Immunities Clause is aimed mainly 
at the legislative branch of state governments and enjoins them from making certain 
laws (but it also enjoins the enforcement of improper laws too). The Due Process 
Clause is aimed mainly at the judicial branch of state governments and enjoins them 
from sanctioning the violation of otherwise proper laws without following procedures 
that ensure accurate outcomes (but it would apply to “administrative” procedures as 
well). And the Equal Protection Clause is aimed mainly at the executive branch of 
state governments and mandates that protection of proper laws be provided equally 
to all persons. 
Id. 
ZPARK.FIN 9/12/2006 8:45:35 AM 
837] The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas 
 841 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.
11
  
Explaining the history and purpose of each of the three preceding 
clauses is well beyond the modest purview of this paper; nevertheless, 
it is helpful to illustrate a few principles that underlie the Privileges 
or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Despite the robust debate in contemporary constitutional theory 
over the existence and validity of unenumerated constitutional rights, 
ample evidence exists that the framers of the original Bill of Rights 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for constitutional 
protection of individual natural rights not specifically listed in the 
text of the Constitution.
12
 The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
serve as a bulwark against infringement of enumerated and 
unenumerated rights by state legislatures. In 1833, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applied only to the federal government, and not to the states.
13
 This 
precedent, among others, called into question the validity of early 
Reconstruction era legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
14
 
Representative John Bingham, author of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, argued that the absence of Congressional power to 
protect the rights of American citizens from state governments 
“makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment.”
15
 
Moreover, he saw slavery as the issue preventing the original framers 
from protecting the natural rights of all citizens against unwarranted 
                                                
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 12. See generally BARNETT, supra note 9, at 259, arguing that theories of both original 
intent and original meaning reveal a desire on the part of the respective framers of the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to protect unenumerated natural rights.  
The Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause referred to natural 
rights because it was impossible to specify them all in advance. Any approach that 
overlooks this in favor of particular historically situated liberties runs afoul of 
original meaning. . . . [These provisions were] added to the Constitution precisely 
because it was impossible to enumerate all the liberties we have and undesirable even 
to try.  
Id. at 258–59. 
 13. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 14. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 193. 
 15. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866)). 
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state interference; had such a provision been placed in the original 
Constitution, its existence would have negated the institution of 
slavery—a bargain that would have likely doomed ratification.
16
 
In drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative 
“Bingham used the words privileges and immunities as a shorthand 
description of fundamental or constitutional rights” that state 
legislatures could not abridge.
17
 The phrase “privileges and 
immunities” of course can be found in the original 1789 
Constitution,
18
 and had a long and distinguished history by the time 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted. “Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England . . . divided the rights and 
liberties of Englishmen into those ‘immunities’ that were the 
residuum of natural liberties and those ‘privileges’ that society had 
provided in lieu of natural rights.”
19
 This view was fleshed out in 
early American jurisprudence by Justice Bushrod Washington’s 
celebrated opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,
20
 a decision he authored 
while sitting as a circuit court trial judge. Justice Washington 
famously wrote in that case: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these 
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their 
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the 
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What 
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious 
than difficult to enumerate . . . . These, and many others which 
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and 
immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each 
state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to use the 
expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the 
old articles of confederation) “the better to secure and perpetuate 
                                                
 16. Id. at 193–94. 
 17. Id. at 61 (citation omitted). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 19. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 64 (1986)). 
 20. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
ZPARK.FIN 9/12/2006 8:45:35 AM 
837] The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas 
 843 
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the 
different states of the Union.” 
21
 
Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion represents an articulation 
by the first generation of American jurists that recognizes the validity 
of unenumerated natural rights protected as privileges and 
immunities by the Constitution. When explaining the meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Senator Jacob Howard read 
from Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion, stating that “[s]uch is 
the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the 
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”
22
 Speaking 
of the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he further noted: “To these privileges and 
immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be 
fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these 
should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the 
first eight amendments of the Constitution.”
23
 
A simple reading of the plain language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as understood by those at the time of its adoption may 
well have recognized that it serves as a limiting function preventing 
state legislatures from enacting measures that unnecessarily abridged 
the natural rights, both enumerated and unenumerated, shared by all 
American citizens; unfortunately, the Supreme Court eviscerated the 
                                                
 21. Id. at 551–52. Justice Washington does list several examples of recognized privileges 
and immunities here: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe 
for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; 
to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold 
and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes 
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as 
some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly 
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to 
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws 
or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. 
Id. 
 22. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 194 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. (citation omitted). 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause in its infamous 1873 decision in the 
Slaughter-House Cases,
24
 rendering it a dead letter. 
Slaughter-House is a problematic decision for several reasons. 
Chief among these is that it completely distorted the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
25
 Because of the Court’s decision in 
Slaughter-House, the Fourteenth Amendment was effectively stripped 
of one of its primary purposes: to restrict state legislatures from 
enacting measures that violated the substantive rights—enumerated 
and not—presumed to be enjoyed by all citizens of the nation 
because of their status as such. The effect of Slaughter-House was to 
limit judicial recourse of citizens denied substantive liberties as a 
result of state legislation. With this in mind, it is not an 
overstatement to argue that the case effectively nullified one of the 
major purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judicial protection 
of substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
completely destroyed by Slaughter-House however. Within a few 
decades, the Court would begin the slow process of applying the 
Due Process Clause to do the work intended for the Privileges or 
                                                
 24. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The Court upheld a state law granting a monopoly to a certain 
slaughterhouse in the city of New Orleans. In rejecting an argument based on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, against clear evidence to the 
contrary, held that the clause did not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, but 
rather protected only rights that flow from the relationship between a United States citizen and 
the federal government. Justices Field and Bradley each authored vigorous dissents defending 
judicial application of the clause against state legislation and arguing in favor of the validity of 
unenumerated natural rights against encroachment from state legislation. Justice Field’s dissent 
argued that the clause does not attempt to confer new privileges or immunities upon U.S. 
citizens; it rather assumes that there are such privileges and immunities that belong of right to 
citizens as such and ordains that they shall not be abridged by state legislation. Justice 
Bradley’s dissent suggests monopolies are banned under a theory of natural rights observed in 
the Declaration of Independence and assumed in the Constitutional structure. 
 25. See supra note 10; see also Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice 
Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
627, 686 (1994). 
[T]here was a clear consensus that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to have a substantive role. That role was to enforce 
national privileges and immunities or rights. . . . These views were before the public 
in the debates of Congress and undoubtedly specifically known to the Justices. 
  When one examines the opinion articulated by Justice Miller to defend the 
majority decision, one finds the errors so immense and the gap between the intent 
of the amendment and Miller’s ruling so great, that many are willing, on that basis 
alone, to believe the [sic] Miller deliberately attempted to defeat the force of the 
amendment. 
Aynes, supra. 
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Immunities Clause: to limit arbitrary suppressions of liberty by state 
legislatures.
26
 
B. The Rise and Fall of Early Substantive Due Process 
As the Progressive Era dawned at the end of the 19th century, 
state legislatures began passing laws limiting a variety of economic 
activities as well as passing a substantial amount of morals legislation 
aimed at promoting “public health.”
27
 Even as this type of legislation 
grew in popularity, the Supreme Court began infrequently striking 
down a number of state statutes on due process grounds.
28
 Most 
famously, in Lochner v. New York,
29
 the Court struck down 
maximum-hour regulations for workers in a bakeshop on the 
grounds that such provisions violated the so-called “liberty of 
contract” implicit in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process protection 
of liberty. The Court also struck down non-economic legislation on 
Due Process grounds, holding for instance that liberty embraced by 
the Due Process Clause grants the right to provide one’s children 
with religious education,
30
 and the right to educate one’s children in 
                                                
 26. This move is controversial of course, both for opponents and even many proponents 
of unenumerated constitutional rights. There is a valid argument that can be made to 
demonstrate that there is a “substantive” component of liberty understood by the Due Process 
Clause—namely that it is within the province of “judicial review to ensure that a law being 
applied to a particular person was within the proper constitutional power of the legislature to 
enact,” making the scrutiny of “the substance of statutes . . . a part of the procedures that must 
be followed before a law may be enforced by death, imprisonment, or fine.” Barnett, supra 
note 10, at 7 (forthcoming). Nevertheless, the move to the Due Process Clause to review state 
legislation distorts the Fourteenth Amendment in many key ways: 
(1) It shifts the substantive scrutiny of laws from the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
to the Due Process Clause; (2) because the Due Process Clause protects all persons, 
using it to scrutinize laws obscures the fact that a proper law may make distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens; (3) it distorts the original meaning of “liberty” in 
the Due Process Clause by stretching its meaning beyond the matter of deprivation 
of liberty by imprisonment; (4) when “liberty” is expanded in this way, it is not clear 
how it fits with “property”; and (5) it limits the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to life, liberty, and property and not other positive rights or privileges 
of citizenship that may properly be denied to non-citizens but not to citizens. The 
most serious consequence of stretching the Due Process Clause beyond its original 
meaning to substantively scrutinize laws is how it undermines the legitimacy of this 
type of scrutiny. 
Id. 
 27. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 22. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 30. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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one’s native language.
31
 These cases are significant in that they do 
not find deprivations of life, liberty, or property because of 
unconstitutional or unfair defects in the procedural aspects of state 
action. Rather, the Court rejected the laws because they infringed on 
the substantive liberty rights that all Americans were guaranteed by 
virtue of their status as citizens. In short, so-called “substantive due 
process” was used by the Court to protect the type of rights that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment originally envisioned to be 
embraced by the Privileges or Immunities Clauses. 
Today, Lochner and its progeny
32
 stand among the most 
criticized and universally rejected decisions in the history of the 
Supreme Court. Progressives both then and now saw Lochner as 
undue judicial interference with the rational legislative judgment that 
contract rights and wealth distribution are not beyond the reach of 
appropriate state intervention.
33
 Similarly, many modern 
conservatives, likely upset with the Court’s revival of a form of 
substantive due process in post-Griswold sexual autonomy cases, also 
reject the reasoning of Lochner and view the case as an egregious 
form of judicial activism.
34
 
The Lochner era was indeed flawed, but not in the way that its 
critics from both the left and the right most commonly complain. 
The problem with Lochner is not that it protected economic rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment or that it required state 
governments to justify economic regulations without granting such 
legislative judgments a presumption of rationality, and thus, 
                                                
 31. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 32. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating a law 
treating the manufacture of ice like a public utility on Due Process grounds); Williams v. 
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (rejecting price regulations on Due Process grounds); 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding minimum wage law for women 
workers violated the Due Process Clause); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding 
that laws protecting the right to organize unions violated the Due Process Clause). 
 33. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
 34. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 49 (1990): 
In his 1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from what he 
conceived to be “a mere meddlesome interference,” asked rhetorically, “[A]re we all 
. . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?” The correct answer, where the 
Constitution is silent, must be “yes.” Being “at the mercy of legislative majorities” is 
merely another way of describing the basic American plan: representative 
democracy. We may all deplore its results from time to time, but that does not 
empower judges to set them aside; the Constitution allows only voters to do that. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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constitutionality. The Fourteenth Amendment, as originally drafted 
and understood, did not contemplate the protection of individual 
privileges and immunities only from legislation that is discriminatory; 
rather the amendment contemplated a robust view of individual 
liberties, both enumerated and unenumerated in the text of the 
constitution that were intended to be amiable to judicial 
enforcement. As Professor Barnett points out, “The content of the 
Civil Rights Act is significant because it identifies some of the 
privileges or immunities protected from abridgement by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. And these included the ‘right . . . to make 
and enforce contracts’—the very right protected by the Court in 
Lochner v. New York.”
35
  
The real problem with Lochner is that the Court tacitly accepted 
the premises of Slaughter-House when it used the Due Process 
Clause as the mechanism to enforce economic liberties. Because the 
Court used the Due Process Clause—and even then used it 
inconsistently and almost haphazardly
36
—to invalidate economic 
legislation during the Lochner era, it opened itself up to charges of 
activism because it stretched the clause beyond its original 
applications regarding the purely procedural aspects of due process.
37
 
Thus, although the Lochner court was rightly attempting to discern 
the proper limits of economic liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, its project was doomed from the start because it was 
unable to use the broader contours of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to establish such limits. Left only to use the Due Process 
Clause, the Lochner Court developed a theory of economic liberty 
that was ill-suited for interpretation under the Due Process Clause as 
it should properly be understood: as a protection against unfair or 
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or property in the judicial 
administration of the law.
38
 
                                                
 35. Barnett, supra note 10, at 8–9. 
 36. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining a state law limiting 
employment hours for female employees notwithstanding a Due Process Clause claim). 
 37. See Barnett, supra note 10. 
Lochner and the other Due Process Clause cases of the Progressive Era—and 
substantive due process cases today—are all problematic because they continue to 
respect the precedent of the Slaughter-House Cases and refuse to restore the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Id. at 9. 
 38. Id. 
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As the Great Depression dawned and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt instituted New Deal economic policies that expanded 
elements of the progressive agenda to the national level, the Supreme 
Court became increasingly resilient to efforts to regulate the national 
economy through Congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause.
39
 Roosevelt responded to the Court’s rejection of New Deal 
legislation with his infamous “court-packing plan.” The plan 
ultimately failed, but whether from the pressure placed on the Court 
from Roosevelt and public opinion, or from the influx of more 
progressive appointees on the Court, the Supreme Court abandoned 
its controversial Lochner-era jurisprudence in 1937.
40
 The Court, in 
one of its most monumental reversals, began upholding economic 
regulations against individual claims of right and refusing to read 
substantive due process claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment 
against the presumed constitutionality of regulatory legislation.
41
 
What remained of the “substantive” due process of the Lochner 
era was effectively swept away the next year by the Court’s decision 
in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
42
 The decision itself, which 
upheld a federal law that prohibited the shipment of “filled milk” (an 
oil added milk product) in interstate commerce, swept far beyond 
the regulatory apparatus implicated by the facts of the case. The 
Carolene Products Court ushered in a “presumption of constitution-
ality” to the rational regulatory acts of legislative bodies, declaring 
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is 
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon 
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators.”
43
  
                                                
 39. See, e.g., Schecter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 40. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state maximum 
hours law for female employees and effectively overturning Lochner). 
 41. See id.; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 42. 304 U.S. at 144. 
 43. Id. at 152. 
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The case is most noted for its fourth footnote,
44
 which appended 
to the presumption of constitutionality for the rationally-based 
regulatory acts of government a reservation of judicial scrutiny for 
the non-economic rights protected by the Bill of Rights, and for the 
protection of “discrete and insular minorities” who are not protected 
within the political process. It is hard to overstate the impact of 
Footnote Four in the Court’s substantive due process analysis.
45
 The 
footnote established the basis for modern strict scrutiny review 
conducted by the Supreme Court. Legislative acts are given a 
presumption of constitutionality by reviewing courts based on a 
theory that such laws are the result of a rational and democratic 
process. Only where a law targets a discrete or insular minority that 
does not have access to the political process, or where the law 
violates the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights are the courts 
allowed to use more exacting “strict scrutiny” to evaluate the 
justification of legislative acts. 
As the tide of Roosevelt appointees took their seats on the 
Court, it appeared substantive due process was dead. The regime 
                                                
 44. Id. at 152 n.4 (Holding that “[t]here may be a narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . [P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 45. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 
1088–89 (1982). Justice Powell described the legacy of Footnote Four on subsequent 
constitutional law as such: 
This footnote now is recognized as a primary source of “strict scrutiny” judicial 
review. Indeed, many scholars think it actually commenced a new era in 
constitutional law. The footnote also is thought to have provided its own theoretical 
justification. The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4, as expressed by more 
than a few prominent scholars, is roughly as follows: The fundamental character of 
our government is democratic. Our constitution assumes that majorities should rule 
and that the government should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, 
Congress and the state legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose. But 
there are certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process. 
And the political process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the 
way it protects most of us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the 
Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of government: First, to clear 
away impediments to participation, and ensure that all groups can engage equally in 
the political process; and Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation 
inimical to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in 
the legislative process. 
Id. 
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enacted by Footnote Four served as a standard by which the Court 
continually deferred to the rationality of the legislature in reviewing 
due process claims.
46
 In 1955, Justice William O. Douglas declared 
the complete death of economic substantive due process, noting, 
“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.”
47
 
C. Substantive Due Process After Griswold: Footnote Four Plus 
As it would turn out, reports of the death of substantive due 
process were greatly exaggerated.48 Within a decade of Justice 
Douglas’s eulogy for substantive review of due process claims, the 
Court revived the doctrine to examine cases concerning personal 
autonomy and sexual privacy. The roots of this jurisprudence can be 
found in Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.
49
 
Foreshadowing something of the approach that the Court would 
adopt five years later in Griswold v. Connecticut,
50
 Justice Harlan 
argued for a judicial role in defining and establishing the limits of 
personal autonomy embedded within the “substantive” component 
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Recognizing that personal autonomy—implicated in 
the case before him in the form of a married couple’s sexual 
relations—is a form of “liberty” protected by the Constitution, 
Justice Harlan set out to establish the limits of permissible activity 
protected by that liberty. Thus, for Justice Harlan, the Constitution’s 
protection of liberty is broad and calls for a judicial role in defining 
such liberty: 
                                                
 46. See e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963). After noting that the 
Court had declined “the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws 
which the majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise,” Justice Black 
commented, “We refuse to sit as a ‘super legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.’ . . . 
[Whether] the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes or 
some other is no concern of ours.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 47. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
     48 .  Following the erroneous publication of a premature obituary in the New York 
Journal, Mark Twain famously responded: “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” 
See Wikipedia, Mark Twain, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain (last visited Aug. 3, 
2006).  
 49. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 
“liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of 
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; 
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .
51
 
Justice Harlan’s “rational continuum” of liberty embraced the 
notion that in a constitutional system, the conscientious judge has a 
duty to reject impositions on liberty that are arbitrary or purposeless. 
Although this view is not a sweeping libertarian rejection of plenary 
legislative powers, it is the contemporary articulation of the principle 
that judges have a defined constitutional role in establishing the 
content and limits of the broad guarantees of liberty established in 
the Constitution.
52
 Thus, in the context of personal sexual 
autonomy—and its expression in the right of the marital couple to 
have access to contraceptives—Justice Harlan would hold that it is a 
liberty interest entitled to heightened scrutiny by the courts. As 
Justice Harlan wrote, 
This, then, is the precise character of the enactment whose 
Constitutional measure we must take. The statute must pass a more 
rigorous Constitutional test than that going merely to the 
plausibility of its underlying rationale. This enactment involves 
what, by common understanding throughout the English-speaking 
world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 
“liberty” . . . and it is this which requires that the statute be 
subjected to “strict scrutiny.”
53
 
In 1965 the Court decided the case of Griswold v. Connecticut
54
 
and ushered in the contemporary era of substantive due process that 
has been described as “Footnote Four Plus.”
55
 In this watershed 
case, the Court revived a strain of its substantive due process 
jurisprudence, which had been dormant since the end of the Lochner 
                                                
 51. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542–43 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 52. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(analyzing favorably Justice Harlan’s dissent regarding the limited judicial review role). 
 53. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 55. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 254. 
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era in 1937, by striking down a Connecticut law interfering with the 
right of married couples to gain information about, and to use, 
contraceptives. Justice Douglas’s opinion for the majority found that 
a right to privacy, protecting the right of married couples to make 
contraceptive choices, can be construed from “penumbras and 
emanations” of the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.
56
 Justice Harlan concurred, 
advocating a substantive due process theory of liberty similar to the 
one sketched in his Poe opinion,
57
 and Justice Goldberg concurred 
arguing that the law violated unenumerated rights protected by the 
Ninth Amendment.
58
 
Thus, with Griswold, the Court reentered the substantive due 
process thicket by moving beyond the technical limits of Footnote 
Four and embracing judicial interpretation and enforcement of 
unenumerated rights. However, just like the Lochner decision before 
it, Griswold would prove controversial for its advocacy of 
unenumerated rights and for its seemingly Byzantine approach in 
deciding which unenumerated rights are entitled to judicial scrutiny 
and protection. The general approach that would emerge in 
substantive due process cases following Griswold involved a focus on 
the “fundamentality” of the liberty interest being asserted against a 
particular law or regulation. A right attains fundamental status if it is 
“deeply rooted in [the] history and traditions” of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence
59
 or if it is “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”
60
 Substantive due process in the Footnote Four-Plus regime 
enacted by Griswold thus serves to “elevate[] some unenumerated 
rights to the exalted status of ‘fundamental’ while disparaging the 
other liberties of the people as mere ‘liberty interests.’”
61
 In short, if 
a plaintiff challenging a regulation cannot demonstrate that the right 
being asserted is fundamental, their substantive due process claim 
will likely fall to the presumption of constitutionality given to 
legislation under “rational basis review.” In this sense, the majority 
opinion’s approach in Griswold is markedly different from the view 
articulated by Justice Harlan, both in his Poe dissent and in his 
                                                
 56. Griswold, 381 U.S at 484. 
 57. Id. at 501–02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 59. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 60. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 61. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 254. 
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Griswold concurrence.
62
 Under Justice Harlan’s view, the substantive 
rights protected by liberty need not be fleshed out according to the 
specific enumerations of the Bill of Rights. Rather there is a clear 
judicial role—albeit one informed by clear standards of review—that 
prescribes protecting liberty interests that are not explicitly listed in 
the Constitution, but nevertheless are inherent to the very idea of 
ordered liberty.
63
 An important question remains unanswered that 
will emerge again later: if the Court were to view liberty as a 
“rational continuum” in the manner suggested by Justice Harlan, to 
what extent does the influence of traditional and historical values 
govern the limits of judicially recognized and protected liberty 
interests?
64
 
In the years following Griswold, the Court has issued a number 
of holdings
65
 that together have come to recognize “that the 
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive 
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the 
person,” particularly in regards to issues of sexual and reproductive 
                                                
 62. See Griswold, 381 U.S at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring) (“In my view, the proper 
constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.’ For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. 
Ullman, I believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or 
more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their 
radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on 
its own bottom.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. Id. at 501. 
 64. But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Harlan, in a departure from his disciples on the Lawrence court, makes a strong case for 
traditional moral values as a strong limitation against judicial expansion of protected liberty 
interests in certain types of sexual conduct: 
Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely 
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of 
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. 
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be 
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, 
as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which 
express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form 
a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any 
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis. 
Id. 
 65. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a 
New York law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under sixteen 
years of age); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to elect an 
abortion has real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process 
Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending contraceptive rights to non-
married persons). 
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freedom.
66
 However, none of these cases started with the 
presumption that an individual’s liberty interests are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary government regulations. 
Rather, the Court’s focus remained on the fundamentality of the 
privacy interest being asserted and the burden remained with the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that their substantive rights claim overcame 
the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the government. 
Moreover, although the Due Process Clause was used by the Court 
as the doctrinal basis of several of its decisions during the last four 
decades of the 20th century, its analysis remained with Griswold’s 
emphasis on privacy, however nebulously constructed, rather than 
with the protection of “liberty” associated with the writings of 
Justice Harlan and more closely related to the type of unenumerated 
rights envisioned in the pre-Slaughter-House Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  
D. Bowers v. Hardwick 
One post-Griswold case, in particular, is highly relevant to any 
discussion of Lawrence. In its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
the Court upheld a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy
67
 between 
consenting adults
68
 against the challenge of a homosexual man who 
was arrested for engaging in an act of homosexual intimacy in a fact 
pattern nearly identical to the one that would come before the court 
seventeen years later in Lawrence. Respondent Hardwick challenged 
the Georgia statute on various Fourteenth Amendment grounds. A 
deeply divided Burger Court ruled 5-4 that Georgia’s sodomy law 
was constitutional, refusing, in the words of Justice Byron White’s 
majority opinion, to declare “a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.”
69
 In repudiating much of the Court’s sexual 
autonomy jurisprudence since Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice White 
                                                
 66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). 
 67. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (providing, in 
pertinent part: “(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to 
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . . 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than 20 years . . . .”). 
 68. Significantly, at least in terms of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence 
which focuses on the Equal Protection Clause in striking down the Texas law, the Georgia law 
applied to heterosexual as well as homosexual acts of sodomy. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 
(1984). 
 69. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
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declared that “[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to 
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having 
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution.”
70
 Declining to offer strict scrutiny to Hardwick’s 
Fourteenth Amendment claims,
71
 the Bowers majority similarly 
rejected Hardwick’s argument that the law lacked a rational basis
72
 
because it served merely to express a majoritarian moral preference 
against the legitimate privacy rights of individuals wishing to express 
their sexual intimacy through acts made criminal under Georgia’s 
law. 
Four justices, led by Justice Harry Blackmun, dissented in the 
boldest of terms. Blackmun, foreshadowing Lawrence,
73
 argued that 
the majority’s claim that Hardwick was requesting a declaration of a 
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy” was entirely 
incorrect in light of the Court’s earlier sexual autonomy 
jurisprudence.
74
 The dissent strongly suggested the majority 
unjustifiably focused on the act of homosexual sodomy and the social 
taboos surrounding it, rather than the broader, and obviously 
protected, “right to be left alone” in making personal decisions 
                                                
 70. Id. at 194–95. 
 71. Id. at 194 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, 
facetious.”). 
 72. Id. at 196. Justice White’s opinion defended the rationality of Georgia’s moral 
justifications for its law in the staunchest of terms: 
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts that 
there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case other 
than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual 
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to 
support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if 
all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such 
claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality 
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the 
sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis. 
Id. 
 73. Id. at 214. Blackmun noted, 
I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and 
conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to 
conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most 
deeply rooted in our Nation’s history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever 
do. 
Id. 
 74. Id. at 199.  
ZPARK.FIN 9/12/2006 8:45:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
856 
about whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual 
sexual intimacy.
75
 Such forms of conduct, the dissent observed, strike 
to the very core of defining “human existence,” and are treated far 
too lightly and dismissively by the majority.
76
  
E. Substantive Due Process in the Rehnquist Court:  
Casey and Glucksberg 
Substantive due process jurisprudence has been significantly 
developed by key decisions during the 1990s. These decisions set the 
tone for Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence and helped establish 
the ongoing debate among members of the Court as to the proper 
standards of review to be used in substantive due process cases. 
In an important precursor to Lawrence, the Court shifted its 
substantive due process emphasis from “privacy” to “liberty” in 
1992. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in reaffirming the right to abortion 
established in Roe v. Wade.
77
 The Court’s majority held that the 
decision to abort a pregnancy, protected by the Due Process Clause, 
deserved heightened scrutiny because of its essential relationship to a 
person’s sense of ultimate identity and values, indeed the person’s 
very conscience, explaining that 
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could 
                                                
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)). 
Blackmun argues, 
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is “a 
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community 
welfare, and the development of human personality.” The fact that individuals 
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships 
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many “right” 
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a 
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and 
nature of these intensely personal bonds. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.
78
 
This language signaled a burgeoning paradigm shift in the 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. In Casey, liberty, not 
privacy, did the work under the Due Process Clause. Justice Kennedy 
would return this same reasoning eleven years later in Lawrence. 
The Rehnquist Court issued another landmark substantive due 
process decision in the 1997 case Washington v. Glucksberg.
79
 In 
Glucksberg, the Court unanimously upheld a Washington law that 
criminalized physician-assisted suicide.
80
 The plaintiffs, who included 
both doctors and terminally ill patients, asserted a liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause in allowing a mentally 
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.
81
 
Relying heavily on history and the Anglo-American common law,
82
 
the Court concluded that there exists no fundamental liberty interest 
in physician-assisted suicide. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, argued that in addition to the Court’s traditional criteria 
for evaluating a substantive due process claim—“found in the history 
and traditions” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest must be capable of “careful 
description.”
83
 The Court thus refused to characterize a broader 
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide such as “the right to die” 
and thus concluded that no such fundamental liberty interest exists. 
After denying strict scrutiny of the liberty interest asserted, the Court 
found Washington’s asserted interests of preserving human life and 
avoiding a slide towards euthanasia as easily meeting a rational basis 
test.
84
 
Although the Chief Justice wrote for a unanimous Court, the 
method of analysis used in the majority opinion to evaluate the 
substantive due process claim was anything but unanimous. Five of 
the Justices concurred with the Court’s decision, but differed from 
the Court’s analysis on various points, many going as far as to argue 
that patients have a right to palliative care, even if such care would 
                                                
 78. Id. at 851. 
 79. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 80. Id. at 709. 
 81. Id. at 708. 
 82. Id. at 710–12. 
 83. Id. at 721. 
 84. Id. at 728. 
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kill a patient.
85
 Indeed, at no point is it clear that a majority of the 
Court accepted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s version of substantive due 
process analysis.  
Justice Souter’s concurrence focused on the importance of 
Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent and argued that each deprivation of 
liberty should be balanced against the relative strength of the state’s 
interest involved. Justice Souter begins his concurrence by noting 
the legacy of Slaughter-House on the Court’s substantive rights 
jurisprudence.
86
 He then praises Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent as a 
model for the proper judicial role in adjudicating substantive rights 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Souter argues that 
the Poe dissent stands for no less than three key propositions: that 
there is an important and recognized judicial role in conducting 
substantive due process, “that the business of such review is not the 
identification of extra-textual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative 
resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite 
possibly worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the 
history of our values as a people,” and a recognition of “the basic 
need to account for the two sides in the controversy and to respect 
legislation within the zone of reasonableness.”
87
 With this in mind, it 
is the duty of Courts reviewing substantive rights claims to recognize 
“a continuum of rights to be free from ‘arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints.’”
88
 For Justice Souter, although history and 
traditions are the starting place for this type of analysis, emerging 
standards of liberty in a developing system of ordered liberty surely 
must come into play for the judge conscientiously conducting 
substantive due process review. Also, it is interesting to note that in 
the above framework, the reviewing judge is concerned with the 
rationality of the legislation rather than the fundamentality of certain 
                                                
 85. See id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s opinion on this 
point was largely echoed by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
 86. Id. at 760 n.6 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter notes: 
The Slaughter-House Cases are important, of course, for their holding that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was no source of any but a specific handful of 
substantive rights. . . . To a degree, then, that decision may have led the Court to 
look to the Due Process Clause as a source of substantive rights. . . . But the courts’ 
use of due process clauses for that purpose antedated the 1873 decision, as we have 
seen, and would in time be supported in the Poe dissent, as we shall see. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 762–65 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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extra-textual rights. The presumption in such analysis begins to shift 
from regulatory constitutionality to individual liberty. 
Taken with his joint opinion in Casey, Justice Souter’s 
articulation of Justice Harlan’s Poe opinion reflected an emerging 
awareness among some members of the Rehnquist Court that 
substantive rights analysis is neither tied down to strict articulations 
of the fundamentality of the right being asserted, nor exclusively to 
history and tradition. Rather, for the first time, a substantial portion 
of the Court’s membership recognized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a rational continuum of liberty rather than 
“isolated pinpricks” of fundamental rights. The Casey plurality and 
Justice Souter’s Glucksberg concurrence demonstrate that, by the 
1990s, at least some members of the Court were becoming 
increasingly uncomfortable with the substantive due process 
methodology embodied in the Footnote Four Plus regime. The 
evolution of the Court’s understanding of the substantive rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and its own role in 
establishing standards to review claims of such rights was beginning 
to follow a path more in line with the original meaning of the 
Amendment. The stage was thus set for the type of substantive rights 
analysis that the Court would deploy shortly thereafter in Lawrence. 
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
A. The Facts and the Procedural Posture of Lawrence 
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance, two officers of 
the Harris County Police Department entered the residence of 
petitioner John Geddes Lawrence in 1998.
89
 The officers observed 
Lawrence and another man, petitioner Tyron Garner, engaging in a 
consensual sexual act.
90
 The officers arrested the two men, who were 
then held overnight before being charged and convicted before a 
Justice of the Peace.
91
 The men were convicted of violating a state 
law prohibiting homosexual sodomy
92
 through their act of “deviate 
                                                
 89. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003). 
 90. Id. at 563. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. The applicable state law broken by the petitioners was TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
21.06(a) (2003) providing that “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex,” defined as, “(A) any contact between any 
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the 
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. § 21.01(1). 
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sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex 
(man).”
93
 
The petitioners challenged their conviction in Harris County 
Criminal Court as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and an analogous provision of the Texas 
Constitution. The court rejected those claims and fined the 
petitioners $200 each and assessed court costs of $141.25.
94
 The 
Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District rejected the 
petitioners’ federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and upheld the convictions, finding the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick
95
 to be controlling.
96
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Texas 
Fourteenth District’s decision to consider three questions: whether 
the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause, whether the 
Texas law violated the Due Process Clause, and whether Bowers 
should be overruled.
97
 
B. The Majority Opinion 
It is through the lens of Bowers that Justice Anthony Kennedy 
approaches the facts of Lawrence in the Court’s majority opinion.
98
 
Kennedy begins his constitutional analysis of Lawrence’s claim by 
noting that the case must “be resolved by determining whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”
99
 To this extent, 
Kennedy sets aside the Equal Protection Clause issue
100
 and deems it 
                                                
 93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 96. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 97. Id. at 564. 
 98. Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens (who had 
vigorously dissented in Bowers), David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in the Court’s judgment, finding the Texas statute 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id. at 579. 
 99. Id. at 564. 
 100. See id. at 574–75. 
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici 
contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the 
instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were 
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necessary to revisit Bowers.101 Using Griswold as a “beginning point,” 
Kennedy cites the various holdings102 of the Court since the 1960s 
that have come to recognize “that the protection of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person,” particularly in 
regards to issues of sexual and reproductive freedom.103 
With this background, Kennedy proceeds to a discussion of 
Bowers, holding that decision as anomalous to the Court’s other 
substantive due process cases.104 Kennedy refers to the Bowers 
majority’s characterization of the issue before it as a determination of 
whether or not there is a “fundamental constitutional right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy” as a disclosure of its “failure to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”105 In a sweeping 
philosophical difference of opinion from Bowers, Kennedy observes 
that the law before the Court in Lawrence, as well as the law that was 
before the Court in Bowers, does far more than prohibit a particular 
type of sexual conduct. For the majority, such laws intrude upon a 
presumption of liberty that is granted to acts of private, and 
presumably consensual, sexual conduct: 
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The 
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or 
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
106
 
Taking this analysis a step further, the majority observes that 
such liberty interests preclude the state from intruding upon personal 
                                                                                                           
we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might 
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit 
the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants. 
Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 564. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(invalidating a New York law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons 
under 16 years of age); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to 
elect an abortion has real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due 
Process Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending contraceptive rights to 
non-married persons). 
 103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 104. Id. at 567.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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choices protected by the Constitution, including choices related to 
sexual autonomy: 
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the 
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set 
its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution 
the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may 
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as 
free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element 
in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by 
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.
107
 
The Court’s analysis of Lawrence’s claim is interesting because it 
adjudicates the claim without clearly articulating the standard of 
review that it is using. The Court does not declare that the Texas 
sodomy law violates a “fundamental right,” thus failing a strict 
scrutiny analysis; nor does the Court specifically declare that the law 
lacks a rational basis. Rather, the Court simply states that the 
petitioners have a constitutionally-protected liberty to decide the 
nature of their intimate sexual conduct that the Texas law violates. 
Thus, without announcing a particular standard of review or scrutiny 
offered to liberty interests embedded in the intimate conduct of 
homosexual individuals, the majority holds that the Bowers court 
greatly misinterpreted the claim before it.
108
 Finding that the 
historical grounds for sodomy prohibitions that the Bowers court 
heavily relied on in its decision were “overstated” and “more 
complex” than indicated,
109
 Kennedy next moves to discuss the 
moral considerations that underlie Bowers. 
Kennedy notes that much of the historical support for sodomy 
laws stems from the invocation of traditional values or “Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards,”
110
—the “religious beliefs,” 
“conceptions of right and acceptable behavior and respect for the 
traditional family” that are often used as justifications for prohibiting 
homosexual behavior.
111
 Although these beliefs are far from trivial 
                                                
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 571. 
 110. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
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and can be “profound and deep,” for the Lawrence majority, they fail 
to answer the question before the Court.
112
 The Court declines to 
enforce these views on the operation of all society through the 
criminal law, as it finds that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty 
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
113
 
The Court, in an effort to expand its due process inquiry beyond 
an examination of only history and tradition,
114
 observes that against 
the historical state interest in preserving a traditional sense of 
morality
115
 is “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”
116
 The majority cites evidence 
buttressing this “emerging awareness,” ranging from the elimination 
of sodomy as a crime from the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code, to the broad consensus against sodomy laws that has 
developed in Europe since at least before the time Bowers was 
decided, to the fact that the number of states with sodomy laws on 
their books had dwindled from twenty-five as of the time of Bowers 
to thirteen (of which only four applied exclusively to homosexual 
conduct) when Lawrence was heard by the Court in 2003.
117
 
Additionally, substantive due process cases since Bowers were 
seen by the majority as greatly questioning its rationale. Justice 
Kennedy cites approvingly the Court’s decision in Casey as 
reaffirming the substantive force of liberty, and significantly not 
privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause, particularly as to 
choices one makes regarding sexuality.
118
 Similarly, the Court’s 
                                                
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 114. Id. at 572 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”)). 
 115. See id. at 571–72. The majority goes to great lengths to establish that the historical 
moral consensus regarding homosexuality found by the Bowers court is far from apparent and 
that the evidence offered by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger in their respective opinions 
was clearly overstated. 
 116. Id. at 572.  
 117. See id. at 572–74. It should be noted that Lawrence is very much a part of an 
ongoing debate on and off of the Court regarding the use of foreign legal opinions in U.S. 
Constitutional cases. 
 118. Id. at 573–74 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
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holding in Romer v. Evans
119
 is seen by the majority as explicitly 
denying the moral disapproval of homosexuals—“like a bare desire to 
harm the group”—as a sufficient basis to satisfy rational basis 
review.
120
 Thus, although the Court does not specifically say that it is 
using rational basis review, it does hold in essence that the mere 
moral disapproval of homosexuality by a legislative majority does not 
constitute a rational basis supporting the constitutionality of 
resulting legislation. Romer thus becomes a guidepost for the Court 
in treating homosexuality with a higher level of judicial scrutiny than 
it originally did in Bowers. 
In a brief note on stare decisis, the majority observes that because 
the “holding in Bowers . . . has not induced detrimental reliance 
comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are 
involved,” the Court should not feel restrained to let Bowers stand 
on stare decisis grounds when there is ample evidence that its 
rationale does not withstand careful analysis.
121
 Thus, in light of the 
substantive due process analysis it has just conducted, the Court 
declares “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today,” and, as it should not remain binding precedent, “it 
should be and now is overruled.”
122
 
Kennedy’s majority opinion ends where it began, with a clear 
focus on liberty. Observing that the sexual conduct of the petitioners 
did not involve minors, coerced consent, persons who might be 
injured, public conduct, or prostitution, the Court declares that 
“[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”
123
 
The Court notes that its decision is not designed to give formal 
recognition of any relationship that homosexual persons may choose 
to enter into; rather, the Court’s decision is simply that “[t]he State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making 
                                                                                                           
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State.” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)). 
 119. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to Colorado’s constitution 
which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either by 
“orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,” and deprived them of protection under state 
antidiscrimination laws was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” and failed 
rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the measure had no rational 
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose). 
 120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 582–83. 
 121. Id. at 577. 
 122. Id. at 578. 
 123. Id. 
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their private sexual conduct a crime.”
124
 Thus, the right of the 
petitioners and other homosexual persons to “liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter.’”
125
 Because the Texas statute furthers 
no legitimate state interest for its broad intrusions into the personal 
and private lives of individuals, it cannot withstand scrutiny under 
the Due Process Clause.
126
 
The majority opinion concludes with the observation that its 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause is wrought from the 
understanding that the drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not presume to know liberty in its manifold 
possibilities.
127
 This is significant because the Court appears to be 
recognizing that the substantive content of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, rooted as the majority sees it in the Due Process 
Clause, is not bound purely by history and tradition in its present 
day form. It may well be the case that laws once seen as necessary 
and proper serve only to oppress. Thus, “[a]s the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.”
128
 
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Antonin Scalia issued a particularly scathing dissent in 
Lawrence, which was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
Justice Clarence Thomas. Many of Scalia’s sharpest barbs were 
directed at what he perceived as the majority’s abuses of discretion. 
Scalia argues that the Court was wrong in citing foreign sources of 
authority to interpret the extent of liberty offered to homosexuals 
under the Due Process Clause,
129
 and in its use of Casey (where the 
Court declined to overturn Roe v. Wade on stare decisis grounds) to 
argue that stare decisis should not apply to Bowers.
130
 Although many 
of Justice Scalia’s arguments raise nuanced issues of constitutional 
                                                
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 126. Id. at 578–79. 
 127. Id. at 579. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 598. 
 130. See id. at 586–91. 
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law that exceed the scope of this note, his chief objection strikes to 
the heart of the debate over the role of morality in law in the wake of 
Lawrence: what standard of review ought the Court give to liberty 
interests advanced by Lawrence and those similarly situated? Justice 
Scalia, observing that the majority’s standard of review is unclear, 
notes at the beginning: 
Thus, while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves 
strangely untouched its central legal conclusion: “[R]espondent 
would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.” Instead 
the Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as “an exercise of 
their liberty”—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an 
unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching 
implications beyond this case.
131
 
Here Scalia rightly observes that the majority has declined to give 
“strict scrutiny” or a similar standard of review to some fundamental 
right claimed by the petitioners, and notes that the Court has not 
observed a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 
From the premise that there is no fundamental right to homosexual 
sodomy under the Due Process Clause, Justice Scalia concludes that 
the Court ignores earlier doctrine establishing that “only 
fundamental rights qualify for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ 
protection—that is, rights which are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition’”— in invalidating Texas’s law.
132
 
Justice Scalia questions the Court for invalidating Texas’s law 
because it imposes constraints on personal liberty, noting that while 
the sodomy law undoubtedly constrains liberty, “[s]o do laws 
prohibiting prostitution, recreational use of heroin, and, for that 
matter, working more than 60 hours per week in a bakery.”
133
 Scalia 
observes that by definition the “emerging awareness” in favor of 
increased liberty rights cited by the Court cannot be “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition[s].”
134
 As the Court did not, 
and could not in Scalia’s estimation, reverse Bowers in finding a 
“fundamental right” to engage in sodomy, Scalia argues that its 
subsequent use of rational basis review is deeply flawed.
135
 Scalia 
                                                
 131. Id. at 586 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 132. Id. at 593 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)). 
 133. Id. at 592. 
 134. Id. at 598 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (emphasis added)).  
 135. Id. at 599. 
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questions the Court’s blanket dismissal of Texas’s claimed interest in 
its law, noting that, 
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its 
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and 
unacceptable,”—the same interest furthered by criminal laws 
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and 
obscenity. Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest.
136
 
For Scalia, the majority “effectively decrees the end of all morals 
legislation” in declaring that the state’s intrusion into the personal 
life of the petitioners constitutes a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.
137
 Justice Scalia believes that if the majority is correct, a 
slippery slope emerges, depriving the state of its power to legislate 
morality: “If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian 
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the 
above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.”
138
 
Justice Scalia concludes his dissent with an extraordinary passage 
criticizing the Court’s decision as a “product of a law-profession 
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual 
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual 
activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has 
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”
139
 Scalia argues that 
the Court has chosen to “take[] sides in the culture war” and in so 
doing, ignores the fact that its views are not those of mainstream 
America.
140
 Scalia claims that what the Court calls “discrimination,” 
the majority of Americans view simply as measures “protecting 
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be 
immoral and destructive.”
141
 In a final argument against the Court, 
Scalia claims that homosexuals have the right to persuade their fellow 
citizens to repeal sodomy laws, but should have no recourse in the 
courts to overturn democratically-approved and rationally-based 
morals legislation. Scalia, expressing his moral positivism, concludes, 
[P]ersuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one’s 
views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I 
                                                
 136. Id. (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 602. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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would no more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts—or, 
for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of them—than I 
would forbid it to do so. What Texas has chosen to do is well 
within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand 
should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 
“constitutional right” by a Court that is impatient of democratic 
change.
142
   
Justice Scalia’s opinion offers an important critique of the substantive 
rights analysis developed by the majority and praised in this note. 
This note will address some of Justice’s Scalia’s more pointed 
concerns in the following section. 
D. What Lawrence Did and Did Not Do 
At the end of the day, it is important to consider what Lawrence 
accomplished and what it did not accomplish. Most obviously, the 
decision invalidated the Texas sodomy law because it violated a 
liberty interest recognized by the Court to be protected under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, although 
Lawrence still remains committed to the post-Slaughter-House focus 
on the Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in adjudicating substantive rights, it implicitly follows the 
path developed in the Casey plurality opinion and recognized in 
Justice Souter’s Glucksberg concurrence in viewing the limits of 
constitutionally protected rights as existing on a rational continuum 
open to “emerging standards of decency.” For the majority, 
although history and traditions play a beginning role in substantive 
rights analysis, they play only a beginning role. The Court holds that 
for matters going to the ultimate questions of “existence” and 
“meaning,” the individual’s right to liberty is both protected by the 
Constitution and entitled to continuing recognition as new patterns 
of such liberty emerge in a developing society. 
It is also clear that Lawrence expands the notion of sexual 
autonomy protected under the Constitution. It recognized that 
Bowers was an anomaly in the Court’s adjudication of sexual 
autonomy cases under the Fourteenth Amendment and accordingly 
set that decision aside as an incorrect precedent. In doing so, the 
Court clearly indicates that the expressions of intimate sexual 
                                                
 142. Id. at 603. 
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conduct between consenting adults are protected by the 
Constitution. 
Finally, in an extension of Romer, the Court recognized that the 
moral disapproval of a particular form of private sexual conduct on 
the part of a legislative majority does not constitute a rational basis 
justifying laws punishing or discriminating against such conduct. 
Thus, Lawrence uses a form of rational basis review that actually 
demands that the government show a justification for its restriction 
on liberty beyond an appeal to tradition, history, or morals. Such a 
move implicitly recognizes a judicial role in reviewing state 
legislation for violations of minority rights protected by the 
constitution, not as a usurpation of legislative power, but as a 
structural counterweight to the majoritarian passions that from time 
to time strip the individual of the rights guaranteed her by the 
Constitution.  
On the other hand, Lawrence does not create a fundamental 
right to engage in homosexual conduct. Nor does it proscribe a new 
standard of review to be used for all substantive due process cases. 
Nor does it return us to a libertarian utopia overseen by omniscient 
jurists that can protect citizens from all arbitrary and capricious uses 
of state power.  
But within Lawrence there is a potential reworking of many of 
the problems that have plagued Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
rights jurisprudence since Slaughter-House. As the next section will 
argue, if the Court expands Lawrence beyond sexual autonomy cases, 
there is tremendous potential for the decision to revolutionize, for 
the better, the manner in which federal courts review state legislation 
that infringes on the enumerated and unenumerated rights 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution because of their 
essential place within the concept of ordered liberty. If the Court 
does not expand Lawrence beyond its subject matter, it is possible 
that Lawrence, like Bowers before it, will soon come to be seen as an 
anomaly in the Court’s jurisprudence—a “one-hit wonder” in 
constitutional law deployed when the Court only finds it expedient 
to do so.  
IV. LAWRENCE AS A POTENTIAL LIBERTARIAN REVOLUTION 
Having offered analysis of Lawrence in the preceding section, this 
note will now discuss Lawrence’s potential impact on constitutional 
jurisprudence and the moral limits of criminal legislation. Lawrence, 
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if read correctly and consistently by future courts, has the potential 
to restore an accurate understanding of the substantive rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the role of the 
judiciary in protecting those rights. The robust conception of liberty 
advanced by Lawrence embraces a view of autonomy that is central 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of substantive liberties 
and to broader conceptions of human autonomy central to the 
purposes of liberal society. Lawrence thus has the potential to be 
nothing less than a watershed moment for a renewed soundness in 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
A. Lawrence as a Libertarian Revolution 
In Lawrence, the focus on liberty leads the Court to shift 
burdens of proof from the plaintiff asserting a substantive rights 
claim to the government defending its regulation; the claimant in 
Lawrence was not required to demonstrate that his liberty interest 
was fundamental. Rather, the government, under a form of “rational 
basis with a bite,” was required to show that its regulation did not 
arbitrarily interfere with an important liberty interest. This 
development has the potential to improve the Court’s analysis of 
future cases involving substantive rights claims by restoring the 
Court’s focus to the fundamental nature of the government’s reason 
for its restriction on liberty rather than on the individual’s expression 
of liberty. Such a move would capture the original purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—expressed in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause—to protect the fundamental rights enjoyed by all American 
citizens. Put differently, Lawrence may hopefully soon come to be 
seen as a libertarian revolution
143
 ushering in an era of heightened 
deference to a presumption of liberty protecting the private actions 
of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against unjustified 
state action.
144
 
Randy Barnett, a scholar at Boston University Law School and 
the Cato Institute, a Washington-based libertarian think tank, argues 
                                                
 143. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 21.  
 144. Id. But see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 
(2004) (arguing that a libertarian reading of Lawrence is mistaken because it fails too see the 
Court is upholding a “fundamental right” within its silences); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did 
Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 
(2003) (arguing that Lawrence stands for the proposition that the criminal prohibition on 
sodomy is unconstitutional because it intrudes on private sexual conduct without having 
significant moral grounding in existing public commitments). 
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that by choosing to protect a broad claim of “liberty” in Lawrence, 
the Court soundly returns itself to a broad constitutional vision of 
individual liberties that avoids many of the more egregious mistakes 
of twentieth century substantive due process jurisprudence.
145
 
Because the Lawrence Court eschewed the substantive due process 
framework created by Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,
146
 it is possible that future cases pitting the liberty 
interests of the individual against the legislative judgment of the state 
will, like Lawrence, neither presume constitutionality for the state’s 
regulation, nor require a showing that the liberty interest being 
asserted is “fundamental.” Barnett notes that, although it is never 
explicitly stated, 
Justice Kennedy is employing . . . a ‘‘presumption of liberty” that 
requires the government to justify its restriction on liberty, instead 
of requiring the citizen to establish that the liberty being exercised 
is somehow ‘‘fundamental.’’ In this way, once an action is deemed 
to be a proper exercise of liberty (as opposed to license), the 
burden shifts to the government. All that was offered by the 
government to justify [the statute in Lawrence] is the judgment of 
the legislature that the prohibited conduct is ‘‘immoral,’’ which for 
the majority (including, on this issue, Justice O’Connor) is simply 
not enough to justify the restriction of liberty.
147
 
If Barnett is correct, Lawrence represents a constitutional 
revolution for two reasons. First, Lawrence successfully overcomes 
                                                
 145. Barnett, supra note 27, at 21. Barnett observes, 
[c]ontrary to how their decision was widely reported, the Lawrence majority did not 
protect a “right of privacy.” Instead, quite simply, they protected “liberty.” 
Breaking free at last of the post-New Deal constitutional tension between the 
‘presumption of constitutionality,” on one hand, and “fundamental rights,” on the 
other, Justice Anthony Kennedy and the four justices who joined his opinion did 
not begin by assuming the statute was constitutional. But neither did they call the 
liberty at issue “fundamental,” which the modern Court would have been expected 
to do before withholding the presumption of constitutionality from the statute. 
Instead, the Court took the much simpler tack of requiring the state to justify its 
statute, whatever the status of the right at issue. 
Id.  
 146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 147. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36. It is probably also worth recalling that Justice Thomas 
called Texas’s law “uncommonly silly” and noted that he would have voted to repeal it were he 
a legislator. Although Justice Thomas declined to join the majority because he does not believe 
that the Supreme Court should enforce substantive due process claims against the states, one 
could presume that Justice Thomas is a seventh “vote” recognizing that the purported moral 
basis of Texas’s law is a relatively flimsy justification for its existence. 
ZPARK.FIN 9/12/2006 8:45:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
872 
the major shortcoming of much of the post-Griswold jurisprudence. 
Second, the decision places the onus on governments to demonstrate 
the fundamentality of its legislation and refuses to accept legislative 
appeals to tradition and morality alone as sufficient for meeting a 
rationality requirement. 
The first component of the potential Lawrence revolution comes 
from the Court’s use of rational basis review. As was discussed 
earlier, the Footnote Four Plus regime requires judges to find extra-
constitutional “fundamental rights” in order to justify striking down 
some of the most obvious examples of undue state interference with 
personal autonomy. By placing its emphasis on whether or not the 
petitioners are free to engage in private conduct as an exercise of 
their “liberty” under the Due Process Clause,
148
 the Court returns 
itself to legitimacy
149
 and avoids a “jurisprudence of doubt” by 
placing the obligation on the state to justify its regulation, rather 
than on the individual to justify her exercise of liberty. Although 
Lawrence does not take the simplest and most appropriate tack by 
simply invalidating the Texas sodomy law under the Privileges or 
Immunities clause, its version of rational basis review under the Due 
Process Clause is such that it preserves many of the intuitions about 
substantive rights that underlie the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
This doctrinal move is significant because it, along with other 
recent developments, signals a potential return of the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to its proper foundations.
150
 
Although the Court gutted the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
Slaughter-House, it may not yet be a dead letter.
151
 Although the 
Court since Slaughter-House has used the Due Process Clause to 
protect citizens against state laws that violate their unenumerated 
natural rights, such protection has not been at the level warranted by 
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
152
 
Under a proper construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
abridgments of personal liberties guaranteed to all American citizens 
                                                
 148. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. It is significant that “liberty,” unlike “privacy,” is 
explicitly mentioned in the text of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 149. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 29–31 (discussing the shortcomings of Griswold). 
 150. See supra Part II.A. 
 151. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (basing the unenumerated right to travel in 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
 152. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 320–21. 
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by state legislation should be litigated in federal court. “When state 
legislatures restrict liberties of the people, they are no more entitled 
to be the judge in their own case than is Congress. The exercise of 
liberty by the citizen should not be restricted unless the state can 
show, to the satisfaction of an independent tribunal of justice, that 
such a restriction is both necessary and proper.”
153
 
Of course Lawrence does not sweep this far and it does not 
resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But Lawrence’s 
burden-shifting more closely approximates the original meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the unenumerated rights 
of citizens than Griswold and its progeny. Thus, Lawrence makes 
sound doctrinal sense by protecting liberty rather than privacy, 
“without any discussion of whether or not the liberty involved is 
‘fundamental.’”
154
 The Lawrence court protects the rights of the 
petitioners to engage in sexual activity that is protected under the 
contours of the Fourteenth Amendment and does so without having 
to fashion any judicially-created rights or offering any activist 
remedies; the Court simply asks the state of Texas to justify its heavy 
restriction on liberty imposed by its sodomy laws and, finding no 
necessary or proper justifications for the laws, protects the liberty 
interest of the petitioners as American citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If the court seizes upon this type of reasoning and 
pursues it in future cases, much of the confusion and political 
controversy surrounding substantive rights jurisprudence could be 
cleared away. Judges would not be declaring “fundamentality” to 
one set of favored rights of either the left or the right in a manner 
that would smack of activism. Rather, all liberty interests that 
amount to more than mere license could be given a presumption of 
constitutionality rebuttable by a showing on the part of the 
government that its restrictions on such interests are necessary and 
proper according to some enumerated power or another. 
Second, Lawrence is a triumph because it may stand for the 
proposition that the mere invocation of morality is no longer a 
rational justification for legislation interfering with the liberty 
interests of individuals presumed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As Barnett argues, a legislative judgment of “immorality” simply 
means that a majority of a legislature disapproves of the conduct 
                                                
 153. Id. at 321. 
 154. Id. at 334. 
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being legislated against.
155
 Although this view may treat too glibly 
the strongly held moral beliefs of many Americans against 
homosexuality, the fact remains that, for all intents and purposes, the 
rational basis standard of review that the Supreme Court offered to 
“mere” liberty interests (as opposed to “fundamental” rights) prior 
to Lawrence upholds essentially any legislative judgment of 
morality.
156
 Thus, if a court declines to find a liberty interest to be 
“fundamental,” as it did in Bowers, there is virtually zero chance that 
the liberty interest will be sustained by the Court under the Due 
Process Clause if the legislature proffers a “moral” justification for its 
law. This is problematic, as Barnett observes, because “a doctrine 
allowing legislation to be justified solely on the basis of morality 
would recognize an unlimited police power in state legislatures.”
157
 
And, of course, an “[u]nlimited police power is the very definition of 
tyranny.”
158
 
Moreover, by refusing to recognize “morals” legislation as a 
justifiable exercise of the state power, the Lawrence court recognizes 
an important judicial limit on the power of the states to restrict 
individual liberties. Although the Constitution surely recognizes a 
residual police power in the states, it is far from clear that this power 
was ever recognized to extend to wholly private conduct. Lawrence is 
crucial in restoring the integrity of the Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in this context as well because it limits the 
exercise of arbitrary state restrictions of private liberty, one of the 
essential purposes of the Amendment. This does not mean that 
Courts are designed to sit as super-legislatures that serve to override 
majoritarian and democratic rule that judges find displeasing. Rather, 
it means that when a particular democratic impulse serves to 
undermine the substantive rights guaranteed to all American citizens 
by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Courts have a role in 
limiting legislative power. And the courts have a particularly 
important role to play when popular legislation serves to arbitrarily 
deprive individuals of their substantive rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment under vague appeals to “morals.” As Barnett explains: 
                                                
 155. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36. 
 156. At least for claims under the Due Process Clause; see supra note 6 for a discussion of 
Romer and other Equal Protection cases where the court did use a form of rational basis review 
to strike down “morals” legislation. 
 157. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36–37. 
 158. Id. at 37. 
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The protection of “morals” is the most dubious aspect of the 
traditional construction of the police power . . . . Only very rarely 
was the power to protect “morals” used to reach wholly private 
conduct. In other words, the traditional police power would more 
accurately be defined as giving states power to protect the “health, 
safety, and public morals” of the populace. A police power to reach 
purely private “immoral” acts could always be asserted by a 
legislature whenever it decides to prohibit any form of conduct. By 
providing no judicially enforceable limit whatsoever on the police 
power of states, such a construction would violate the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because it would permit 
legislatures to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens, and 
because it appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution, such a 
claim of power is illegitimate.
159
 
Thus, at the end of the day, Lawrence, can be seen as a “very 
simple, and indeed, elegant ruling.”
160
 Where earlier cases demanded 
that specific liberty interests be litigated and approved of by the 
Court before being recognized under the Due Process Clause, 
Lawrence establishes that an area of personal autonomy exists as an 
irreducible minimum preventing the state from arbitrarily depriving 
persons of their right to define and constitute their own preferred 
mode of existence. Lawrence is likely to endure because it “highlights 
the futility of describing liberty in so one-dimensional a manner” as 
Bowers did.
161
 Indeed, “[t]he whole of substantive due process, 
Lawrence teaches us, is larger than, and conceptually different from, 
the sum of its parts.”
162
 
Despite the fact that Lawrence is praiseworthy as a significant 
victory for liberty, few on the Court or elsewhere would be inclined 
to support it as a good precedent, much less as a revolution in 
substantive due process, if, as Justice Scalia claims, it truly “decrees 
the end of all morals legislation.”
163
 For while, as has been noted 
above, it is untenable for the Supreme Court of the United States to 
accept a general legislative desire to prohibit “immorality” as a 
rational basis for any criminal law, few among us would feel 
comfortable living in a society where morality ceases to serve at all as 
                                                
 159. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 334. 
 160. Barnett, supra note 27, at 40. 
 161. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935 (2004). 
 162. Id. at 1937. 
 163. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599. 
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a justification for criminal prohibitions. The next section of this note 
addresses the moral limits of the criminal law in the wake of 
Lawrence’s expansion of constitutionally protected personal liberty 
interests in expressions of human sexuality. 
B. The Limits of Legal Moralism: A Rejoinder to Justice Scalia 
One of the primary arguments made by Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence focuses on what he perceives as the chief threat of the 
Court’s opinion: an emptying of moral content from the law, the 
result of acquiescence by the Court to the “so-called homosexual 
rights agenda” in the ongoing culture war.164 Although the majority 
states, in clear terms, that “the fact that the governing majority in a 
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,”165 
nowhere in its opinion does the majority signal a willingness to 
dispense with morals-based legislation altogether. Rather, the 
majority simply holds that a general desire to invoke a particular 
system of moral beliefs, through the operation of the criminal law, is 
an invalid application of morality in the face of an “emerging 
awareness” of a contrary liberty interest.166 
Thus, by invalidating the Texas sodomy law, the Court does not 
also invalidate the role of morality in the law. It merely establishes 
that there are limitations to the role of morality in the law, 
limitations clearly exceeded by the statute before it. Because the law 
lacked a purpose beyond an apparent legislative judgment regarding 
homosexuality as immoral, the law lacked a rational basis justifying 
its heavy burden on the exercise of liberty. In doing this, the Court 
neither acts extraordinarily nor recklessly. If anything, the Court 
follows a longstanding practice of not relying exclusively on a 
morals-based rationale for upholding lawmaking.167 
To understand why Justice Scalia misstates the case, it is helpful 
to consider some of the fundamental intuitions that underlie our 
liberal society. Central to the notion of a liberal democracy is a high 
regard for the autonomy of the individual. Assuring that all citizens 
                                                
 164. See id. at 598–99, 602. 
 165. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 166. See id. at 571–72. 
 167. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1234–36 (2004). 
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are afforded a high measure of autonomy in their personal life 
choices is one of the highest ethical precepts to which a liberal 
society can ascribe. Thus, one of the fundamental moral principles of 
a free society is that the individual, not the state, ought to be 
responsible for making the choices that govern morality in the 
personal sphere. The classic articulation of this notion is John Stuart 
Mill’s essay On Liberty. Mill argues that individuals in civil society 
ought to be granted the highest level of liberty compatible with 
respect to the equal liberties of others. This is because moral virtue is 
best established in a free society where the autonomy of individuals is 
respected by the state.168 
Practically speaking, Mill’s position should be appealing to 
contemporary Americans. Mill’s understanding of virtue fits well into 
a pluralistic system such as the United States. In a free society 
composed of individuals with divergent philosophical, moral, and 
religious persuasions, notions of freedom and morality are defeated 
                                                
 168. For a contemporary explanation of Mill’s view, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 209–10 (1971). Rawls, a contemporary liberal, summarizes the moral intuition 
captured by Mill’s thought explaining the fundamental value of human autonomy: 
Mill defines the concept of value by reference to the interests of man as a progressive 
being. By this idea he means the interests men would have and the activities they would 
rather pursue under conditions encouraging freedom of choice. He adopts, in effect, a 
choice criterion of value: one activity is better than another if it is preferred by those who 
are capable of both and who have experienced each of them under circumstances of 
liberty. 
  Using this principle, Mill adduces essentially three grounds for free institutions. For 
one thing, they are required to develop men’s capacities and powers, to arouse strong and 
vigorous natures. Unless their abilities are intensely cultivated and their natures enlivened, 
men will not be able to engage in and to experience the valuable activities of which they 
are capable. Secondly, the institutions of liberty and the opportunity for experience which 
they allow are necessary, at least to some degree, if men’s preferences among different 
activities are to be rational and informed. Human beings have no other way of knowing 
what things they can do and which of them are most rewarding. Thus if the pursuit of 
value, estimated in terms of the progressive interests of mankind, is to be rational, that is, 
guided by a knowledge of human capacities and well-formed preferences, certain 
freedoms are indispensable. Otherwise society’s attempt to follow the principle of utility 
proceeds blindly. The suppression of liberty is always likely to be irrational. Even if the 
general capacities of mankind were known (as they are not), each person has still to find 
himself, and for this freedom is a prerequisite. Finally, Mill believes that human beings 
prefer to live under institutions of liberty. Historical experience shows that men desire to 
be free whenever they have not resigned themselves to apathy and despair; whereas those 
who are free never want to abdicate their liberty. Although men may complain of the 
burdens of freedom and culture, they have an overriding desire to determine how they 
shall live and to settle their own affairs. Thus by Mill’s choice criterion, free institutions 
have value in themselves as basic aspects of rationally preferred forms of life. 
Id. 
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when the state circumvents individual autonomy by compelling a 
particular view of morality. This does not mean that the state must 
respect any choice that an individual makes or that it cannot develop 
criminal law. It simply means that when an individual’s moral choice 
does not harm the right of other individuals to make compatible 
moral choices of their own, the state has no business in compelling 
its own particular view of morality by making certain choices subject 
to criminal sanction.    
A contemporary exposition of Mill’s position is made by Joel 
Feinberg
169
 in Harmless Wrongdoing, the fourth volume of his work, 
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Feinberg’s work begins with 
an analysis of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which maintains that 
the only justifiable restraint on liberty is the restraint that prevents 
harm to others.
170
 Feinberg defends and fleshes out Mill’s harm 
principle, examining four different “categories of justification for 
criminal sanction” that have been traditionally advanced by various 
communities: harm to others, offense to others, harm to the actor 
herself, and so-called “harmless wrongdoing.”
171
 
In the first volume of his work, Feinberg argues that the 
prevention of harm to others is a clearly acceptable use of the 
criminal law.
172
 Feinberg asserts that “moral harm” to others does 
                                                
 169. See Beschle, supra note 6, for an excellent discussion of Joel Feinberg’s writings in 
the context of Lawrence.  
 170. Mill, supra note 1, at 267. Mill argues: 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so; because it will 
make him happier; because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with 
him, or persuading him . . . but not for compelling him . . . . 
Id. 
 171. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM 
TO OTHERS (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS]; JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM 
TO SELF]; JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING (1988) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING]; JOEL FEINBERG, 
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter 
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS].  
 172. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 11 (arguing that “it is 
legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private harm, or the 
unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institutions and practices”); see 
also FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at xix (defining and justifying the 
harm principle as “[i]t is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be 
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not justify the application of the criminal law;
173
 rather, harm 
requires an actual showing that the other person be harmed in some 
way, not merely made “worse off.”
174
 Feinberg argues that some laws 
criminalizing offenses to others are justified under the harm principle 
in his second volume.
175
 “However, it will be insufficient to invoke 
this justification by merely alleging that someone (or the community 
at large) is offended by the knowledge that otherwise harmless, 
though perhaps repulsive, activity is going on somewhere in 
private.”
176
 Feinberg takes up the issue of “legal paternalism” in his 
third volume, defined by Mill as the use of the criminal law to 
“prevent harm (physical, psychological, or economic) to the actor 
himself.”
177
 Feinberg, like Mill, rejects this position as a valid 
justification for criminal statutes because it too substantially 
interferes with personal autonomy.
178
 Feinberg does, however, allow 
that certain types of “soft paternalism” are “reasonable . . . ‘when but 
only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when 
temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is 
voluntary or not.’”
179
 
With these considerations in the foreground, Feinberg turns to 
the topic of present interest, criminal prohibitions on the so-called 
“harmless wrongdoing” of the individual. Feinberg begins his fourth 
volume by summarizing his earlier definition of the types of harm 
that may properly be criminalized, arguing that only “harm to one’s 
body, psyche, or purse” is justifiably criminal under the harm 
principle.
180
 Feinberg accordingly argues that “where the individual 
is merely acting in a way that, although not presenting any threat to 
                                                                                                           
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one 
prohibited from acting) and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values”). 
 173. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 66. 
 174. See id. at 105 (defining harm as a “setting back, thwarting, impairing, defeating, and 
so on”). 
 175. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 1–3. Application of the offense 
principle is limited to “serious” offenses, which must be the result of wrongful conduct. 
Although such offenses may justify criminal punishment, it generally is of a lesser magnitude 
than actual harm to others. Id. at 3. 
 176. Id.  
 177. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 171, at 4. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 260 (citing FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 171, 
at 12). 
 180. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at xx. 
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others or the community, merely indicates that the actor’s character 
falls short of community norms, criminal punishment will not be 
justified.”
181
 
Feinberg sets out to reject the various rationales offered for 
prohibiting harmless wrongdoing. Feinberg dismisses arguments for 
moral conservativism (the use of legal coercion in order to prevent 
drastic change to a particular group’s way of life)
182
 and strict 
moralism (the use of legal coercion against non-grievance evils 
simply on the basis that they are deemed by some value system as 
“inherently immoral”),
183
 claiming that both rationales fail to square 
soundly with the harm principle.
184
 He similarly rejects “legal 
perfectionism,” the doctrine that “it is a proper aim of the criminal 
law to perfect the character and elevate the taste of the citizens who 
are subject to it,” because it violates the basic principle of liberty that 
she is defending.
185
 Feinberg rejects legal perfectionism because, “[i]t 
would be manifestly absurd to threaten people with punishment in 
order to give them wisdom, style, integrity, or a better sense of 
humor . . . . Genuine generosity, concern, magnanimity, and 
courage are not readily produced by a policeman’s billy club or 
threats of imprisonment.”
186
 In the final analysis, the only “virtue” 
instilled through means of coercion is obedience to authority. For 
Feinberg, and most in the Western ethical tradition from Aristotle 
                                                
 181. Beschle, supra note 6, at 267–68, (citing FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, 
supra note 171, at 118–20). 
 182. See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at 39–80. 
 183. See id. at 124–73. 
 184. See id. at 79–80 (“[M]uch of what we call morality consists of rules designed to 
prevent evils of a kind whose existence would not be the basis of any assignable person’s 
grievance. No one can complain on his own behalf, or vicariously for another, if someone has 
evil thoughts (short of the intention to act on them) or false beliefs, or violates his own 
religious duties. If these things are evils, they are evils that ‘float free’ and are incapable of 
grounding personal grievances. The free-floating evils do not hurt anybody; they cause no 
injury, offense, or distress; they are not in any way unfair. At most, they are matters for regret 
by a sensitive observer. To prevent them with the iron fist of legal coercion would be to 
impose suffering and injury for the sake of no one else’s good at all. For that reason the 
enforcement of most non-grievance morality strikes many of us as morally perverse.”). 
 185. Id. at 277. This does not mean that the state may not choose to instill virtue in its 
citizens. Feinberg claims that it “seems undeniable that the state may properly attempt to 
promote public virtue and raise the level of excellence throughout society by such methods as 
moral and cultural education in the public schools, subsidies to the arts and sciences, and 
awards and prizes to virtuous exemplars.” Id. at 278. 
 186. Id. at 281. 
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on, genuine virtue can only be developed and practiced by the free 
choice of the autonomous individual.
187
 
 If one accepts the premise that in a free society personal ethics 
can result only from individual choice and not state compulsion, 
Feinberg’s analysis offers a good explanation of why it is wrong for 
acts of harmless wrongdoing to be punished by the criminal law. 
After all, if morality is the result of free choice, it is self-defeating to 
compel individual moral action through threat of criminal 
punishment. Seen in this light, much of the alarmism of Justice 
Scalia’s Lawrence dissent can be disarmed. The Court, like Feinberg, 
is not attempting to eliminate the role of morality in the law by 
declining to accept Texas’s asserted “moral” basis for its prohibition 
on sodomy. Although the Court’s opinion holds “a state’s argument 
that in forbidding homosexual sodomy it is merely giving effect 
through law to the moral and ethical principles of a majority of its 
citizens, without more, cannot justify and constitutionalize a 
deprivation of the liberty to engage in such conduct,”
188
 “[it] does 
not disable government from promoting traditional or majoritarian 
views of morality, it merely removes the criminal law weapon of 
coercion.”
189
 
One of the most cited passages from Justice Scalia’s dissent 
argues that by striking down the Texas sodomy statute, the Court 
opens the door for widespread invalidations of other criminal laws 
with a “moral” basis, such as laws “against bigamy, same-sex 
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.”
190
 Although there may be 
logical problems with this slippery slope argument,
191
 its biggest 
problem is that it likely ignores what is truly at stake in the liberty 
interest upheld by the Court. One could argue that Justice Scalia, by 
                                                
 187. See id. at 281–82. 
 188. Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual Sodomy 
Issue: The Journey from Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 78 (2004). 
 189. Beschle, supra note 6, at 269. 
 190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003). 
 191. See Bradley Dowden, Fallacies, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/fallacies.htm#Slippery%20Slope (last visited Apr. 4, 2006). 
Suppose someone claims that a first step (in a chain of causes and effects, or a chain 
of reasoning) will probably lead to a second step that in turn will probably lead to 
another step and so on until a final step ends in trouble. If the likelihood of the 
trouble occurring is exaggerated, the slippery slope fallacy is committed. 
Id.; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Slippery Slop: The Maddening “Slippery Slope” Argument Against 
Gay Marriage, SLATE, May 19, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2100824. 
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focusing on the physical act of homosexual sodomy in his analysis, 
misses the broader point of the Court, namely that it is the liberty 
interest of the individual to define his own concept of existence, not 
his right to engage in physical acts of sodomy, that is truly at stake in 
Lawrence. Another line of reasoning would argue that Justice Scalia 
fails both to see the significance of homosexuality in contemporary 
American life, and to recognize the fact that homosexuality is no 
longer seen by many as a sexual “deviance.”
192
 
While these arguments have their merits, they make too much of 
what ought to be a simple rejoinder to Justice Scalia: the sodomy law 
struck down in Lawrence, unlike many of the contestants in his 
“parade of horribles,” simply eludes adequate justification under the 
harm principle. Justice Scalia is right that some acts, such as 
fornication and masturbation, can probably no longer be 
criminalized in the wake of Lawrence; but these acts would fall under 
an interpretation of the harm principle in the same analysis that 
proceeded above.
193
 Because no one is harmed by these acts 
(assuming that they are done privately and, in the case of fornication, 
consensually), they should not be criminalized based solely on the 
grounds of a generalized moral grievance of the legislature.
194
 
                                                
 192. See Tribe, supra note 161, at 1915. 
Critics of the Lawrence approach often advance hypotheticals about the 
decriminalization of adult incest or bigamy to suggest the supposedly illimitable 
effects of decriminalizing sodomy. When confronted with such hypotheticals, we 
need only ask whether it is at all plausible to imagine the dynamic sketched above—a 
dynamic constituted by violent intolerance toward those open about their intimate 
relations and by equally devastating self-erasure by those closeted about their sexual 
orientations—at work in these other, very different, contexts. Incest laws draw 
circles around individuals, defining the finite set of family members so closely tied by 
blood or adoption that sexual intimacy becomes too dangerous or volatile for 
society to sanction. These restrictions no doubt inflict a heavy burden on particular 
hapless individuals whose misfortune it is to lust after or to fall in love with a family 
member, but such tightly drawn circles bear no real resemblance to the broad lines 
cutting oppressively across society to rule half the adult population off limits as 
sexual or marital partners for a distinct and despised minority. So, too, the circles 
that our adultery and bigamy laws have drawn around married couples have 
established partitions that fall with an undeniably cruel weight upon individuals who 
fall in love or lust with someone else’s spouse. But these laws—special instances, in a 
sense, of the customary bans on interference with beneficial contractual relations—
likewise cut no wide swath through the population to limit the options open to any 
particular oppressed minority. 
Id. at 1944. 
 193. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 271–72. 
 194. Id. 
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As for laws against bigamy, bestiality, incest, and prostitution, it 
should be noted that, unlike prohibitions against sodomy, these laws 
are in most cases designed to prohibit actual harms, as opposed to 
mere “moral” harm. Many (but admittedly not all) instances of 
bigamy and incest are based on fraud and coercion.
195
 Moreover, it is 
important to remember that the Lawrence court did not rule in favor 
of homosexual marriage; it simply held that criminal sanctions 
against private consensual conduct are inappropriate, saying nothing 
about what a state can or cannot do in crafting its marriage statutes. 
There is a substantial public health concern that pervades the taboo 
against bestiality,196 and likewise, concerns for public health and 
against the exploitation of women underlie the criminalization of 
prostitution.
197
 It is worth noting here that the Lawrence majority 
requires of the state justifying a regulation of liberty that it show that 
its regulation is not an arbitrary suppression of liberty.
198
 Where it is 
obvious that Texas’s prohibition on sodomy was nothing more than 
an arbitrary exercise of state authority to express a discriminatory 
moral disapproval of homosexuality, it is possible, and indeed likely, 
that challenges to bigamy, bestiality, and incest laws would be seen 
as having rational justifications by the Court, even in a post-
Lawrence world. 
Moreover, it is crucial to recognize the point made by Professor 
Tribe that it is somewhat disingenuous to compare the insular and 
miniscule part of the population that wishes to voluntarily engage in 
acts of bigamy, bestiality, or incest with the significant population of 
homosexual Americans who define their very identity as gay or 
lesbian persons, and who were genuinely harmed and branded as 
criminals—a stigma that had hampered homosexual Americans in 
areas ranging from employment to adoption rights—by sodomy 
laws.
199
 Indeed, the majority itself makes this argument by asserting 
                                                
 195. Id. at 271, 274. 
 196. Id. at 274. 
 197. Id. at 272. 
 198. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). “Arbitrariness” may well be the 
ultimate standard of review the Court intends to use in the form of rational basis review that it 
creates in Lawrence. Such a view is certainly not at loggerheads with the view of the standard of 
review articulated above. 
 199. See Tribe, supra note 161, at 1944.  
[The] [c]riminalization of same-sex sodomy visited a wide range of harms upon gay 
and lesbian Americans. These injuries are inflicted upon gay men and lesbians 
regardless of whether a given sodomy law is gender-neutral or gender-specific.  
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that an emerging awareness recognizes that liberty includes the right 
to define one’s own concept of meaning, of life, and of the universe. 
This claim carries with it important philosophical assumptions about 
the very nature of autonomy in liberal society.
200
 At a minimum, 
Lawrence recognizes that homosexuality is an expression of human 
sexuality that is at the very heart of personhood—one that the Court 
cannot ignore without debasing some of our most valued social 
notions of human autonomy and freedom as a liberal, constitutional 
society. To equate homosexuality with criminalized activity devalues 
the sense of autonomy that defines personhood in liberal society. 
Indeed Lawrence goes to matters of ultimate conscience and 
personhood; it concerns the facts of life fundamental to the way that 
the individual understands her place in the universe, as well as in civil 
society. The Court exercises an important function by passing 
judgment in this arena: it protects the autonomy rights of a 
significant minority of American citizens against the arbitrary 
                                                                                                           
The approach taken by the Lawrence majority eliminates the harms associated 
with sodomy laws altogether. For example, employers—both governmental and 
private—can no longer rely on sodomy statutes to justify firing or not hiring gay 
employees. Courts cannot invoke a state’s sodomy law to deny custody of a child to 
a gay parent. Most significantly, the privacy approach banished the taint of 
criminality from gay identity. Gay men and lesbians need no longer think of 
themselves as criminals. 
Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509, 
541–42 (2005). 
 200. See RAWLS, supra note 168, at 543. Rawls argues that the intuitions of rational 
individuals adduced from behind a veil of ignorance that blinds them of their own personal 
prejudices and characteristics, would favor protecting human freedom and autonomy as a first 
principle of justice. All free and rational persons in a liberal society would thus want the same 
“primary goods”—liberties and benefits—to be distributed in such a way as to maximize the 
potential that a person could fulfill their own life plan according to their personal conception 
of the good, whatever that conception may turn out to be. Thus, there is a heavy liberal 
intuition in favor of allowing self-respecting and autonomous persons to sketch out their own 
nature in a free society: 
[U]nder favorable circumstances the fundamental interest in determining our plan 
of life eventually assumes a prior place. One reason for this I have discussed in 
connection with liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. And a second reason 
is the central place of the primary good of self-respect and the desire of human 
beings to express their nature in a free social union with others. Thus the desire for 
liberty is the chief regulative interest that the parties must suppose they all will have 
in common in due course. 
Id.; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 50 (1974). Nozick, Rawls’ 
libertarian colleague, similarly sees a paramount value in human autonomy and personhood in 
civil society: “A person’s shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of 
giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive 
for meaningful life.” Id. 
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discrimination of a majoritarian legislative preference that, in failing 
to grasp the true liberty interest at stake in human sexual relations, 
reduces homosexual conduct to a criminal activity. 
Justice Scalia’s remaining “horribles” are easy to distinguish. 
Laws against adultery clearly fall under the purview of the harm 
principle because the philandering spouse obviously harms his or her 
counterpart.
201
 Additionally, adultery violates the contractual nature 
of marriage which society has a cognizable interest in enforcing. As 
for the issue of same-sex marriage, by invoking it, Justice Scalia 
ignores clear statements by the Court that its ruling does not validate 
gay marriage efforts, and “conflates failure of a state to provide equal 
access to benefits with criminal punishment.”
202
 
In short, Justice Scalia’s slippery slope argument ignores the 
central proposition of the harm principle echoed in Lawrence: that 
the state may not criminalize harmless personal behavior that is 
protected because of the autonomy and liberty enjoyed by all 
individuals. Traditional morality, at the end of the day, is no 
justification for coercion on the part of the state. Although the state 
may properly regulate, or make regular, the exercise of individual 
liberty to assure that it does not serve to harm or wrong others by 
becoming mere license,
203
 it simply cannot justify criminal 
restrictions on personal autonomy solely by invocations of 
“traditional morality.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
Few inside or out of the Court have any idea what the future 
impact of Lawrence will truly be. This note has established that 
Lawrence is indeed a landmark decision, and a significant victory for 
a richer Constitutional vision of individual liberty. If Lawrence can be 
developed from its controversial subject matter, perhaps it can 
expand its unique methodology to future cases, thus preserving 
other valuable liberty interests against undue restraints on the part of 
the state.  
The brief example of a timely issue may be illustrative. Last year 
the Supreme Court upheld Congressional regulation of marijuana 
under the Controlled Substances Act pursuant to Commerce Clause 
                                                
 201. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 270. 
 202. Id. at 272–73. 
 203. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 37. 
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powers notwithstanding a California law allowing individual 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes.204 Although the 
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich focused on the Commerce 
Clause, the Respondents in that case raised substantive due process 
arguments claiming that the medicinal use of marijuana is a liberty 
interest protected within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.205 
The Supreme Court did not address the substantive due process 
claim on its merits, but did remand it as a question for the Ninth 
Circuit to reconsider.206  
On Monday, March 27, 2006 the Ninth Circuit heard oral 
arguments in Raich on remand.207 The appellants in Raich argue 
extensively in their briefs that Lawrence’s substantive due process 
analysis requires judicial recognition of an emerging liberty interest 
protecting the rights of certain terminally ill patients to seek palliative 
medical care in the form of cannabis use.208 The appellants in Raich 
cite the Supreme Court’s respect of “decisional autonomy” in 
Lawrence—“the individual’s interest in making basic decisions about 
the course of her life without government interference”—as standing 
for the proposition that medicinal use of marijuana is a 
constitutionally-protected decision that shapes the life of the 
individual.209 
The disposition of Raich by the Ninth Circuit (as well as any 
future Supreme Court review following the Ninth Circuit’s 
anticipated ruling) will offer a window into the future of Lawrence. If 
the Court’s substantive rights analysis in Lawrence stands for what 
this note has presented, the federal courts would be wise to use the 
present opportunity to expand that case’s methodology beyond cases 
concerning sexual autonomy. The medical marijuana issue presents 
another opportunity for the courts to articulate a vision of liberty 
embracing the right of the individual to determine questions of 
fundamental existence free of arbitrary legislative constraints. The 
Ninth Circuit should follow Lawrence in demanding that the federal 
                                                
 204. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 205. Id. at 2215. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Ninth Circuit oral argument schedule, available at http://www.angeljustice. 
org/downloads/RemandNinthCircuitCourtofAppealsCalendar.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
 208. See Brief for the Petitioners, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 
available at http://www.angeljustice.org/downloads/RemandRaichvGonzalesOpeningBrief 
.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
 209. Id. at 27. 
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government justify its restriction on the exercise of liberty central to 
the life decisions made by American citizens. Absent a compelling 
justification on the part of the federal government that prohibitions 
on medicinal marijuana are necessary and proper components of a 
justifiable regulatory system, the federal courts should protect the 
substantive rights of California citizens to use cannabis as a part of a 
regulated palliative care regime. Such a ruling would reinforce the 
doctrinal power of Lawrence and move it beyond the contentious 
realm of sexual autonomy cases.   
In any case, Lawrence should be seen as a valuable piece of 
jurisprudence and should continue to be vigorously defended against 
misinterpretation and abuse by forces on either side of the political 
spectrum. The Court’s decision should not be seen as a rejection of 
the moral beliefs of some Americans or the vindication of the moral 
beliefs of other Americans. It should simply be read for what it is: a 
ringing endorsement of the principle that in the United States of 
America, decisions of fundamental morality are not the province of 
the legislature. Rather, the Constitution protects the right of all 
citizens to decide for themselves questions fundamental to their view 
of life, meaning, and existence. The answers to those questions are 
certainly open to robust debate in a free society. But, unless such 
answers result in a demonstrated harm to others, it is fundamentally 
impermissible for the state to criminalize them. 
Mitchell F. Park 
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